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____________ 
 
O P I N I O N* 
____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 In this appeal Roquette Frères urges that the District Court erred in confirming an 
arbitration award in an intellectual property dispute following dissolution of a joint 
venture.  Roquette Frères, S.A. and Solazyme, Inc. entered into a joint venture named 
“Solazyme Roquette Nutritionals” (“SRN”) to develop and commercialize Solazyme’s 
microalgal products.  The joint venture dissolved, and allocation of SRN’s intellectual 
property became the subject of an arbitration between Roquette and Solazyme.  The 
arbitration Panel granted three types of relief to Solazyme: (1) it assigned SRN’s 
intellectual property to Solazyme alone; (2) it assigned patent applications Roquette filed 
independently to Solazyme; and (3) it awarded Solazyme attorneys’ fees and costs.   
 Roquette argues on appeal that the Panel did not have the authority to issue any 
order concerning Roquette’s independent patent applications; that it should have assigned 
SRN’s intellectual property to Solazyme and Roquette jointly; and that vacatur of the 
award also requires vacating the attorneys’ fees and costs award.  Because the Panel did 
not exceed its authority in making these determinations, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order.  
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Because the parties are well aware of the factual and procedural aspects of this 
litigation we will not recount them here. 
 The standard of review applied by the District Court when asked to confirm an 
arbitration award is extremely deferential. The District Court recognized this and noted 
that “[w]hen parties agree to resolve their disputes before an arbitrator without involving 
the courts, the courts will enforce the bargains implicit in such agreements by enforcing 
arbitration awards absent a reason to doubt the authority or integrity of the arbitral 
forum.”  (J.A. 9 (quoting Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 
2012) (quotation marks omitted))).  Because Roquette did not challenge the integrity of 
the Panel, the award must be vacated “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so 
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made.”  (Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (quotation marks 
omitted))).  The Panel’s authority derives from contract; the question before the District 
Court, then, was whether the Panel’s award was “totally unsupported by principles of 
contract construction.”  (J.A. 10 (citation and quotation marks omitted)).  In reviewing 
the District Court’s confirmation of an arbitration award, we will accept findings of fact 
that are not “clearly erroneous” but decide questions of law de novo.  First Options of 
Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947–48 (1995). 
 The thrust of Roquette’s argument on appeal—as it was in the District Court—is 
that the arbitration Panel exceeded its authority by (1) declaring a breach under the 
Material Transfer Agreement (“MTA”) executed between Roquette and SRN which was 
outside the scope of the JVOA and its arbitration provisions; and (2) taking Roquette 
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property and giving it to Solazyme as part of the award.2  But that is not how the District 
Court, and we, view the Panel’s award.   
 First, it should be noted that the arbitration provision of the Joint Venture 
Operating Agreement (“JVOA”) is very broad.  It states: 
Any dispute of a legal nature arising out of or connected with 
the interpretation or enforcement of the legal duties, rights 
and obligations under this Agreement, including without 
limitation, its validity, application (including whether a 
product is within the Field) or termination, that cannot be 
settled by negotiation pursuant to Section 22.1 or mediation 
pursuant to Section 22.2 shall be referred to and finally 
resolved by arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the 
Center for Public Resources in New York.    
 
(J.A. 138). 
 
 At the heart of the dispute before us is how the Panel should have viewed the 
secret filing, by Roquette, of patent applications in Europe that mirrored patent 
applications filed by SRN. The Panel noted that at least two such applications claimed 
“virtually identical subject matter” as earlier SRN applications “but with none of the 
Solazyme employees listed as inventors.” (J.A 52). The filing of these applications did 
not come to light until the arbitration hearing and, despite discovery requests, Roquette 
                                              
2 Roquette also argues that the Panel improperly reformed certain language of the License 
Agreement when it assigned the rights to improvements made to Solazyme property by 
SRN to Solazyme directly, even when SRN was working jointly with Solazyme or 
Roquette. Whatever the merits of this dispute, we perceive that the Panel interpreted the 
language consistent with ordinary principles of contract construction, including the need 
to avoid “absurd results.” (J.A. 60–61). For that reason, we will not second guess the 
Panel on this interpretive point. See Sutter, 675 F.3d at 220 (“even serious errors of law 
or fact” will not vacate an award where arbitrator made good faith attempt to interpret 
contract).  
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refused to produce the applications.  Instead, Roquette filed litigation in the Delaware 
District Court contending that the arbitrators were exceeding their contractual authority. 
 In its award the Panel stated: 
 
The evidence at the hearing revealed that during the life of the 
Joint Venture, Roquette, surreptitiously, and without notice to 
Solazyme, filed patent applications on its own behalf, based 
upon patent applications filed by the Joint Venture. 
 
(J.A. 52). 
 
 The Panel was clearly skeptical as to Roquette’s assertion of a right to these 
“copycat” applications, and properly credited Roquette’s acknowledgment “that their 
patent applications were for products and processes that were based on the Intellectual 
Property owned by SRN.”  (J.A. 55). 
 The Panel then turned to the issue before it, namely, the distribution of SRN’s 
Intellectual Property assets upon dissolution.  Rejecting Roquette’s interpretation of the 
controlling JVOA provisions, the Panel read all the relevant agreements together and 
concluded that the following provisions of the JVOA controlled what should occur upon 
dissolution under the facts of the case: 
(i) all Improvements to the License Intellectual Property 
licensed to the Company by Solazyme, and any 
improvements, enhancements or refinements thereto 
made after the Accumulation Termination Date, shall 
be assigned by the Company to Solazyme;             
 
(J.A. 57). 
 
 “Improvements” were defined in the parties’ License Agreement (§1.15): 
 
Improvements shall mean any improvements, enhancements, 
modifications or refinements, patented or not, to the Licensed 
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Intellectual Property that are reduced to practice or otherwise 
developed prior to the Accumulation Termination Date, by 
the applicable Party alone or in collaboration with one or 
more Third Parties, which are controlled by the applicable 
party. 
 
(J.A. 59). 
 
 At the arbitration hearing, the parties presented expert testimony as to whether the 
Intellectual Property they brought into the Joint Venture was improved.  The Panel found 
Solazyme’s expert to be more “persuasive and credible” than Roquette’s. (J.A. 63).  This 
is not challenged on appeal. 
 The Panel concluded its award as follows: 
 
We find that Roquette is presently attempting to patent 
intellectual property in its own name and marketing products 
that are based upon intellectual property and products that 
Solazyme contributed to the Joint Venture:  a high lipid algal 
flour and a high protein algal powder.  SRN worked with 
these products and improved them as reflected in the patent 
applications filed by SRN.  Roquette did not previously 
possess any products which were in any way similar to those 
contributed by Solazyme and worked upon by SRN.  Under 
the JVOA (§21:1), upon the dissolution of the Joint Venture, 
the improvements to the Licensed Intellectual property 
licensed to SRN by Solazyme shall be assigned exclusively to 
Solazyme.  SRN shall assign exclusively to Solazyme all of 
the patents, patent applications, trade secrets and know-how 
of the Joint Venture. 
 
(J.A. 65–66 (footnote omitted)).  
 
 In essence, the Panel rejected Roquette’s claim to ownership of the copycat 
applications—a claim that was not asserted beyond the bare filings themselves, as 
Roquette refused to produce or address this issue head-on.  The Panel instead concluded 
that these copycat applications were Improvements on property licensed by Solazyme to 
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SRN and, pursuant to the applicable dissolution provision, must be assigned exclusively 
to Solazyme. 
 Given the breadth of the arbitration provision and the obvious “connection” 
between the copycat applications and the applicable provision of the relevant documents, 
we conclude that the Panel acted within its authority as to the aspects of its award 
complained of by Roquette. 
 Roquette’s focus, however, is on the paragraph that follows the conclusion cited 
above, that reads: 
We also find that Roquette breached Section 3.3 of the 
Material Transfer Agreement and that the so-called shadow 
patent applications filed by Roquette and all patents that may 
be subsequently issued, and the related know-how, now the 
property of Roquette, belong to Solazyme and must be 
assigned by Roquette to Solazyme. 
 
(J.A. 66). This language forms the basis for Roquette’s assertion that the Panel 
improperly declared a breach of the MTA—which had no arbitration provision— and 
exceeded its authority in ordering relief under that agreement. 
 Whether or not it was proper for the Panel to find a breach of the MTA, we view 
this additional finding on the part of the Panel to be surplusage. The Panel had previously 
set forth its directive that “the improvements to the Licensed Intellectual Property 
licensed to SRN by Solazyme shall be assigned exclusively to Solazyme.” (J.A. 66).3 
Thus, the Panel’s notation regarding the breach added nothing to the award. 
                                              
3 The District Court concluded that the Panel exceeded its authority by finding a breach 
of the MTA.  We do not reach this issue as it has it has no bearing on the result in this 
case.  We note that we find it curious that Roquette, if it believed that the MTA was not 
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 Roquette further objects that the Panel lacked authority to grant fees, since it 
exceeded its authority in arbitrating the above-discussed matter. Because we affirm the 
Panel’s authority to resolve the dispute, we affirm its award of fees as well.  
 Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
                                                                                                                                                  
properly the subject of the JVOA arbitration, did not demand arbitration under the 
MTA—a different provision.  We find Roquette’s claim that it properly had title to the 
copycat applications and thus had nothing to arbitrate to be a bit strained. 
